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Introduction
Tax systems in real economies are typically non-optimal. Tax reforms can then be used in order to reduce the level of distortion of economic incentives introduced by the necessity of raising revenue. At the same time, however, tax reforms a¤ect the level of pollution, as the composition of production and consumption change.
In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of the Italian tax system and study the e¤ects of some possible tax reforms on tax distortions and polluting emissions.
By using a dynamic model, we estimate the marginal distortion caused by the di¤erent taxations of production, consumption and incomes. We …nd that these values are far from equal, hence they can be used in designing a policy aimed at reducing the distortion of economic incentives. Unfortunately, these policies are likely to determine an increase in the level of polluting emissions, as they reduce the tax burden bearing on goods with high polluting potential.
We then design a policy with the speci…c goal of reducing the level of polluting emissions by a predetermined percentage with respect to a business-as-usual scenario. While command-and-control policies set arbitrary standards for the reduction of pollution, environmental taxes guarantee that the marginal cost of reducing emissions is equalized across sectors. We allow the tax rate on households income to decrease in order to ensure revenue-neutrality. We …nd that welfare decreases, at least if the e¤ect of environmental quality on consumer utility is not taken into account. Unfortunately, the total welfare e¤ect of the reform cannot be determined without a careful evaluation of the environmental bene…ts of a reduction of pollution.
Tax distortions and environmental distortions
Taxes on production, consumption and income introduce a distortion of incentives as they break the equivalence between the price paid by the buyer and the price received by the producer of a good or service. Hence, each lira of revenue collected by the government costs society more than one lira. For every unit of revenue, distortionary taxation produces a loss of utility or welfare, which must be added to revenue in order to obtain the level of the marginal cost of public funds. If the marginal costs of the funds collected with di¤erent taxes are not equalized, then the tax system is suboptimal and there is space for obtaining an increase in welfare through a revenue-neutral tax reform
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. By reducing the rate of the most distortionary tax and increasing the rate of the less distortionary one, welfare can be increased. In a few simple words, this is the theory of tax reforms.
However, traditional models of tax reform do not take into account pollution and the e¤ect of environmental quality on utility and welfare. When a tax reform is implemented, the composition of production and consumption change, as the relative price of intermediate and …nal goods are a¤ected. Hence, the level of polluting emissions changes. The recent literature on environmental tax reforms points out that the environmental e¤ect of a reform must always be taken into account, even when the reform is not motivated by environmental goals.
Bene…ts and costs of a policy should be compared in order to take a welfare improving decision, but part of these bene…ts, i.e. the environmental ones, are di¢cult to evaluate. The problem could be avoided if we could design a policy that reduces tax distortions and polluting emissions at once. This is the double dividend hypothesis. If this hypothesis is veri…ed, models which do not consider the relation between consumer utility and environmental quality could be used for the valuation of the total welfare e¤ect of a tax reform.
The existence of a double dividend is an empirical matter. Even if the literature has shown that environmental taxes interact with preexisting distortionary taxes 2 , we cannot exclude that a tax reform could reduce tax and environmental distortions. It essentially depends on the initial situation from which the reform is realized. We make reference to the Italian situation in 1992.
Commodity taxation
We consider two main groups of taxes: taxes on incomes and taxes on goods. The former can be divided in taxes on household incomes and taxes on company incomes. The latter includes: sale or production taxes, net of subsidies, value added taxes 3 and tari¤s. In this section we focus on commodity taxation and on the distribution of the tax pressure among the di¤erent goods.
The revenue from commodity taxes in 1992 was 147039.8 billion lira, which represented about 5 percent of the total value of domestic production and imports (evaluated at before tax prices). However, the burden of taxation was not homogeneously distributed. We consider a comprehensive tax rate, which does not distinguish between sale taxes, value added tax and tari¤s, but is calculated as the ratio between the sum of the revenues from all these taxes and the total value of production and imports. Tax rates di¤ered a lot across sectors, varying between a subsidy of 6% to the 'transport' sector and a positive rate of more than 94% on 'coke and oil', which includes re…ned oil. Despite this last sector accounted for only 1.4% of the total value of production and imports, it provided almost 30% of the revenue from commodity taxation. The other sectors characterized by very high tax rates were 'gas' and 'electricity', respectively with 15 and 49%. As a whole, these three energy sectors provided almost 40% of the revenue, even if their weight in economic term was less than 3%.
Among the other sectors, we note that 'other extractions' (other with respect to oil extraction) and 'agriculture' were subsidized, while other tax rates varied between zero and 6%. Of course, public services were almost untaxed.
The whole picture is given in Appendix 2, table 1. These tax rate di¤erentials are probably due to the di¤erent elasticity of the demand for the various commodities, both when they are used as intermediate input and when they are destined to …nal consumption, and to equity considerations. As far as concerns the …rst point, which is related to e¢ciency considerations only, the work by Hatta 4 shows that the optimal structure of the tax on commodities is very close to uniformity. This is the reason why, at least in our model based on a single consumer, we should expect very high values for the marginal cost of public funds raised through the taxation of commodities. This entity is furthermore in ‡uenced by the co-existence with other taxes. In fact, the interaction with income taxation contributes to increase the size of the excess burden.
The marginal cost of public funds
Using a dynamic model for the Italian economy, we can estimate the marginal cost of the public funds raised through the di¤erent taxes on commodities and incomes. We increase each tax rate by 1 percent of its initial value and simulate the e¤ect on the behavior of the economy.
The marginal cost of the funds obtained with a tax is given by the ratio between the variation of the money metric utility of consumers and the variation in the 3 We model the value added tax as a consumption tax. In fact, as a consequence of the system of payments and credits, the burden of the tax bears on …nal consumers only. In the input-output table the value of the revenue from value added tax corresponds to the amount that the sector pays to the government, and is given by the di¤erence between the tax earned on the sales and the tax paid on the purchase of intermediate inputs. This does not correspond to the tax paid by the consumers of the good produced by the sector. We have then calculated the implicit value added tax rate on the output of every sector and used this as the tax rate on …nal consumption. 4 T. Hatta, 'Welfare E¤ects of Changing Commodity Tax Rates toward Uniformity', Journal of Public Economics 29, 99-112 (1986) . present value of future revenues, which is the marginal distortion, plus one. Hence, we have:
where¸is the marginal utility of income, U is the utility of consumers, R is the revenue and t i is the i ¡ th tax. The variation in utility is calculated using the measure proposed by Jorgenson and Yun
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. First, we calculate the value of the marginal cost of the funds raised through all taxes, by allowing all tax rates in the system to vary by the same proportion. We then repeat the experiment for the taxes on household incomes, for the tax on company incomes, for the taxes on sales and on consumption. For these last two groups of taxes, we assume that all tax rates vary by the same proportion (this implies that when tax rates increase the subsidized sectors experience an increase in the subsidy). Hence, we do not try to assess the marginal cost of the revenue for every single commodity tax, but only make a distinction between production and consumption taxes.
The results are summarized in the following Because of tax distortions, each unit of revenue collected through general taxation costs society 1.76
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. Tax rate di¤erentials makes sales and consumption taxation more distortionary than income taxation.
These values look high with respect to the estimates realized for the United States 8 , but they are in the same range of the estimates for Sweden. The di¤erences in the marginal cost of the funds raised through the di¤erent taxes demostrate the possibility of realizing a tax reform that improves e¢ciency. Furthermore, the high cost of the revenue obtained with the taxation of production and consumption of commodities could probably be reduced by shifting to a more uniform structure of the tax rates.
The model
By the way, the structure of our model in ‡uences these estimates. Our simulations are based on a Ramsey model of economic growth for the Italian economy, in which perfect foresight and in…nite time horizon are assumed. Growth is driven by a aggregate household 9 . In every period, the household decides the level of full consumption maximizing a utility function with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Full consumption is then allocated between leisure and consumption goods on the basis of a utility function with constant elasticity of substitution. Finally, commodity demand derive from a Cobb-Douglas subutility function. Savings are endogenously derived as the result of the intertemporal optimization process. Environmental quality does not in ‡uence consumer utility.
In the model, thirteen commodities or activities are identi…ed. We do not make a real distinction between industries and commodities, hence every good is produced by one sector. Output is produced using a constant returns to scale technology. Technological progress is labor augmenting
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. Labor force and capital are mobile across sectors.
As far as concerns imports, we make the Armington assumption. Domestic output is combined with imports to produce a composite consumption supply using a CES function. Exports are price sensitive.
The current account balance and world prices are set exogenously. Also the public de…cit is exogenous. Hence, as tax rates are …xed, public expenditure in commodities is determined endogenously.
We assume intertemporal consistency in the accumulation of government de…cit and of current account balances into new domestic or foreign debt.
The model is calibrated on the base of a social accounting matrix for Italy for 1992.
The primary statistical source is the input-output table for the same year released by the Italian national institute of statistic (ISTAT)
11
. Transfers among institutional sectors (households, companies, government and rest of the world) are evaluated on the basis of the SAM provided by ISTAT for 1990. Public sector de…cit, private savings and current account de…cit are taken directly from the national accounts. Company savings are then calculated as a residual, given the value of investment.
The base case scenario (business-as-usual)
The use of a Ramsey model of economic growth implies some assumptions on the state of the economy in the base year, for which data are available. Does the picture represented by the SAM correspond to a steady state or should we suppose that Italy is far from this stage and will converge to it through time? A simple example can explain the problem. If we are in a steady state, investments must guarantee that the stock of capital increases at the rate of growth of labor, which is given by the sum of the population growth rate plus the rate of labor augmenting technical progress. We assume population to be constant and …x the rate of technical progress to 0.75 percent. Given the estimate of the capital stock, this implies a value of the rate of depreciation of capital. If we think that this value is not acceptable, then we must assume that the economy is not in a steady state and will reach it only in the future. However, this implies that the model is not able to replicate perfectly the base year case, as the assumption of perfect foresight typical of the Ramsey model implies that economic agents anticipate the adjustment process and smooth the behavior of all economic variables. For this reason, we try to limit the assumptions of divergence from an initial steady state. However, the particular situation of the Italian economy in 1992 as far as concerns public debt and current account balance and the need to consider intertemporal consistency in the dynamic of public and current account balance suggest to accept some deviations from an initial equilibrium.
In 1992, Italy had a very high level of public debt, above 100 percent of GDP. In the following years, the situation worsened further, and the ratio between debt and national product rose until a maximum level of 1.25. Only recently the economic reforms started in order to accomplish the standards imposed for the participation to the European Monetary Union have given some results in this …eld and the trend has been reversed. We then assume a pattern of public de…cit which implies a former increase in the ratio between debt and GDP, then a decrease of the same ratio until a level of about 65 percent in 25 years.
The current account de…cit in 1992 was unusually high for Italy. In fact, in the same year a strong devaluation brought the exchange rate to its natural value, after a long period in which it had been defended on values that were inconsistent with the di¤erent level of in ‡ation rate with respect to other countries and in particular to other members of the European Community. We then assume that the current account de…cit decreases and that in the following years Italy runs some surpluses that allow it to pay the debt toward foreign countries.
All other variables and parameters are assumed to be consistent with an initial steady state.
Possible reforms
In this section, we simulate the e¤ects of reforms aimed at reducing the level of tax distortions.
We consider a revenue-neutral reform, which keeps the real value of the public expenditure in commodities in every year at the same level as in the base case. This de…nition of revenue neutrality allows us to ignore the e¤ect of this expenditure on consumer welfare, as the reform does not a¤ect the path of the variable. Alternatively, we could have used a de…nition of revenue-neutrality based on the present value of future real public expenditures. This would have allowed us to keep the value of the tax rates a¤ected by the reform constant throughout time. However, the path of public expenditure in commodities would have been in ‡uenced and the impact on welfare should have been evaluated.
We suppose that sale tax rates are decreased by 5 percent with respect to their initial value and the tax rate on company incomes is allowed to vary in order to ensure revenue-neutrality.
The …gures in Appendix 3 show the e¤ect of the reform on the level of full consumption, labor supply, real GDP and capital stock
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. The solid line represents the base case, the dashed one the counterfactual simulation corresponding to the reform.
The reform produces an increase in utility of 0.07 percent. We observe that the level of full consumption is constantly higher than in the base case, even if it tends to converge to the same steady state value. Labor supply increases slightly, then the consumption of leisure decreases. Hence, utility increases because of the positive variation in the real value of commodity consumption. The e¤ect of the reform on real GDP is small, but in the reform case the value is slightly lower than in the base case. Finally, the capital stock converges to a value that is lower than in the base case.
Despite having increased the tax with the lowest marginal distortion and decreased the one with the highest distortion, the e¤ect on welfare is very small. The size of the variation in the tax rate on company incomes necessary in order to guarantee revenue-neutrality may help to explain this result. In fact, we see that this tax rate must be increased by more than 40 percent: in the steady state, its value is 53 percent higher than in the base case, 24.16 against 15.78 percent. This is a big change, more than marginal by far. It is then possible that the dimension of the reform that we have simulated brings the tax on company incomes to a high level of distortion, reducing the welfare bene…t.
We now simulate a more fundamental tax reform. We eliminate the di¤erentials in the taxation of sales and consumption, …xing a uniform sale tax rate of 10 percent and abolishing the consumption tax. In order to achieve revenue-neutrality, we leave the tax rate on household incomes free to change in every period. In this case, the gain in utility is more consistent and amounts to 1.09 percent. The tax rate on income decreases by more than 25 percent, from 28 to 20 percent. This means that we have actually increased the revenue raised through commodity taxation, which we had seen to be more distortionary than income taxation. The positive e¤ect of the reform is due to the elimination of the di¤erentials in commodity tax rates and to the transition to an uniform system. As we can see in the …gures in Appendix 4, full consumption increases in every period. As in the previous reform, labor supply increases and the capital stock decreases. In this case we have a remarkable reduction in the level of real GDP. The contrast with the result in term of utility shows how the index of production is an imperfect measure of welfare.
Environmental effects
So far, pollution has been left to the margin of our simulations. The level of emissions is endogenous, but calculated only when the solution of the problem is obtained. Now, in order to understand the environmental e¤ects of the policies that we have considered, it is necessary to explain how production, consumption and polluting emissions are related in our model.
We consider three kinds of emissions: sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxides.
Both producers and consumers produce emissions, when they use raw oil, re…ned oil 13 and natural gas. The following equation shows how emissions are determined in the model:
where E is the level of emission, Á is the level of emission per unit of input, µ is the level of emission per unit of consumption, and: xtr = polluting emission: NOX, SOX, CO2; i = sector of production; j = good used as intermediate input or consumed by households; Q = quantity of intermediate input; C = quantity of private consumption.
We derive our coe¢cients Á and µ from the of NAMEA for Italy for 1990. The data on pollution coming from production sectors and consumption are reported in Appendix 2, table 2 .
The coe¢cients Á and µ are allowed to change throughout time. In particular, we suppose that the trend observed in real data in the late eighties and in the early nineties continue in the future. According to this trend, the emissions of sulphur oxides decline by a rate of more than 6% per year, nitrogen oxides emissions decrease by more than 2% per year and carbon dioxide emissions slowly grow.
Both reforms introduced in the previous section have the e¤ect of reducing the taxation of energy sources (the second one reduces also the taxation of energy in consumption). The relative price of oil and gas decreases, hence these commodities are used more intensively from producers and consumers. The …gures in Appendix 3 and 4 show that polluting emissions increase. In the second case, the uniform taxation of sales and the cancelation of the taxation of consumption eliminates the strong pressure on the sectors of oil and gas that we had pointed out above.
As full consumption increases and environmental quality worsens, a valuation of the loss of environmental quality would be necessary in order to determine the net welfare e¤ect of the reforms.
Environmental tax reform
This section considers tax reforms for the control of the level of polluting emissions. The policy-maker uses tax instruments in order to obtain a predetermined environmental goal.
We assume that this goal is the reduction of the level of emissions to 90% of the base case for every pollutant in every period. In order to achieve this reduction, a tax on each pollutant is introduced, both for domestic production and for consumption. Environmental taxes do not bear on imports
14
, as the relative production does not generate pollution within the country. This makes imports more competitive with respect to the domestic production and raises the problem of coordinating environmental policies, an issue that we do not address here. Revenue-neutrality is achieved through the reduction of the tax rate on household incomes.
The taxation of pollution necessary to achieve the desired reduction of emissions generates a considerable revenue, which allows a decrease in the tax rate on household income by more than four percent. However, the net impact on welfare, if the in ‡uence of environmental quality on utility is not taken into account, is negative. Full consumption and utility decrease (utility decreases by 0.3%). The …gures in Appendix 5 show the e¤ect on full consumption, labor supply, real GDP, capital stock and polluting emissions throughout time.
The taxes per unit of pollutant change every year in order to guarantee the achievement of the emission goal. We show the results for period 1 and 60 only: We note that the tax on one of the three pollutants is negative, while we usually expect this value to be positive if we want a reduction in the level of emissions. In general equilibrium, when we deal with the contemporary reduction in the level of more pollutants, it is possible that the emission of one of the pollutants must be subsidized. The total e¤ect of the three taxes guarantees a reduction of all pollutants, included the one whose tax is negative.
It is interesting to analyze the e¤ect of the tax reform on prices and quantities. First, we consider the tax on every unit of commodity produced by the domestic activities in the hypothesis that no adjustment is realized in the choice of the inputs (see Appendix 2, table 3).
With no behavioral responses from producers, the highest increase in the price of domestic production should be expected for gas (21%), electricity (17%) and transportation services (15%). Unexpectedly, the price of re…ned oil (coke and oil sector) would fall (-6%). For consumption, the price of re…ned oil and gas used for transportation and heating would increase sensitively (by 46% and 23% respectively).
However, producers and consumers react to the taxation and to the consequent change in prices. Hence, the general equilibrium results are di¤erent. For example, the price of domestic extracted oil, which would have risen negligibly with no behavioral response, decreases by 4%. The price of re…ned oil decreases, but only by less than 1%. Also the e¤ect on the price of gas is reduced, from a 21% to a 6% increase. The most remarkable increases are still in the price of electricity and transportation (13% and 16% respectively). The increase in the prices of the commodities produced by the manufacturing industry is in the range of 5-6%, while services are less a¤ected, with an increase in price limited to less than 2%.
If we analyze the variation in the quantities produced by the domestic activities, we note that almost all decrease, with the exception of the sectors which supply services, whose expansion is however negligible. The most remarkable reduction in production regards re…ned oil, electricity, gas and transportation (all more than 10%).
Environmental taxes also bear on consumption. Consumption prices are a¤ected both by the change in the price of domestic production and by the taxation of polluting emissions. Hence, consumption prices increase, especially for re…ned oil (42%), electricity (13%), gas (27%) and transportation services (15%). This determines a reduction in the quantities consumed (26%, 6%, 17% and 8% respectively).
It is now interesting to analyze the measure in which every sector has contributed to the reduction of the level of pollution. In fact, environmental taxes are an e¢cient way of achieving a reduction of polluting emissions, because they do not set an arbitrary standard that every activity must comply with. Taxation allows for adjustments and guarantees that the marginal cost of the reduction of pollution is equalized among producers.
Oil extraction, re…ned oil, electricity, gas and transportation give the major relative contribution to the reduction of all pollutants (12%, 10%, 11%, 20% and 14% of the previous level of emissions). A great contribution comes from the households consumption of re…ned oil, with a reduction of emissions of more than 20%.
In Appendix 2, table 3 gives the complete picture. Once again, environmental quality and tax distortions move in opposite directions and the total welfare e¤ect of the reform cannot be determined without a careful evaluation of the bene…ts from the reduction of polluting emissions.
Conclusions
Tax reforms and the quality of environment are related and both the e¤ect on tax distortions and the e¤ect on polluting emission must be taken into account when evaluating a policy.
We begun by showing that the marginal cost of the public funds collected with di¤erent taxes on commodities and incomes in Italy are far from being equalized, so there is space for a welfare improving tax reform, at least in regards to e¢ciency, as far as environmental quality is not taken into account. Our estimates are obtained within an intertemporally consisted dynamic model. We simulate two reforms aimed at reducing tax distortions. As expected, these policies increase consumer utility. However, they have a negative e¤ect on environment, as the level of polluting emissions increases. Tax distortions and environmental quality change in opposite directions.
We then design a policy with the speci…c purpose of reducing emissions by 10% with respect to the base case scenario. Production, consumption and utility decrease. Once again, there is a trade o¤ between environmental goals and the reduction of tax distortions.
We must conclude that, for a correct evaluation of the welfare e¤ect of tax reforms, the process of evaluation of the environmental e¤ect cannot be avoided.
Appendix 1 -From the input-output table to the base of the SAM
The …rst change regards the inputted credit services, given by the di¤erence between the capital return to the credit sector and the interests that this sector pays on deposits. The national accounts do not integrate this value with the input of production sectors, as if it was not possible to say how much of it is paid by every sector on the base of their level of indebtedness. A distribution based on the size of the production would underestimate the costs of sectors with a high indebtedness (like electricity and public administration) and would overestimate the costs of the other sectors. We refer to the work of Bianchi
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, which estimates the degree of indebtedness of the di¤erent activities. Bianchi states that the margin for inputted credit services must be broken in two parts: 213% of it must be distributed among the production sectors, while 113% must be returned to consumers, who have a net credit toward banks and insurance companies. This is like saying that, once the redistribution has been made, the credit sector is the mean through which the interests paid by the companies on their indebtedness is distributed to the consumers, who actually provide the funds. We do not proceed in this way and chose to scale all the coe¢cients in order for them sum up to one. We then chose to let consumers get the money directly from the companies through higher gross management results. 15 C. Bianchi, "Servizi bancari imputati e interdipendenze settoriali: un'analisi strutturale del ruolo del credito nel sistema economico.", Moneta e Credito, vol. 38, n. 150, 183-217 (1985) .
The second change regards the remuneration of the labor of independent workers. In the original input output table, this is part of the return to capital. The national accounts report the value of the income withdrawn by these workers, but do not specify which part is related to their labor input and which part must be considered return to capital. We reduce the share of value added attributed to capital and increase the part to labor, assuming that the share to capital should be expected to be between 35 and 40 percent. This is not made for all sectors, as in some the weight of independent workers and individual …rms is negligible. 
Appendix 2 -Tables

Appendix 3 -First tax reform
Reform which reduces sale tax rates by 5% of their initial values and allows company incomes tax rate to change in order to guarantee revenue-neutrality.
E¤ect on full consumption (index), labor supply (transformation of hours), real GDP and capital stock (trillion lira) and on emissions of sulfur oxides, nitro-oxides (tons) and carbon dioxide (thousand tons), for 60 periods.
The solid line refers to the base case scenario, while the dotted one represents the reform.
Full consumption, labor supply, real GDP and capital stock are expressend in units per unit of e¢ciency of labor (net of growth rate). Emissions are instead expressed in real quantities. 
Full consumption
